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North Korea appeared to remain a clear-cut threat.
The 1980s produced two more trends that made it increasingly difficult for the United States to identify the enemies which U.S.
forces are defending against in Asia. The first is associated with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The second is associated with the sweeping redistribution of economic power from the United
States to Asia.
While it is clear that Soviet military power directed at the Asian theater has not been scaled back anywhere near the same proportion as in Europe, the potential military threat posed by the Soviet Union to Asia has been reduced in several ways. The near collapse of the Soviet economy will discourage foreign adventurism.
By reducing tensions, Soviet leaders hope to establish a more benign security environment that allows them to concentrate greater energies and resources on solving domestic economic and political problems. This shift in Soviet regional policies has reduced tensions and is a major factor in possible resolution of a number of chronic regional disputes, such as the Northern territories dispute with Japan and Cambodia. Moreover, with a smaller proportion of its Navy steaming far afield and its capacity to provide economic assistance curtailed, Moscow is less able to project power beyond its own territory. The first approach is the one proposed by the administration.
The principal elements ef this approach are forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements.
Despite the proposed drawdowns in American forces and active U.S.
base facilities, it is hard to see how this approach is little more than a continuation of Cold War strategies. It is an approach that relegates the United States to the status of an armed protector of states that are "beating our pants off" in world trade marketplace.
The enhanced economic power of the countries in the region combined with America's own economic problems argues for a new security system to replace the bilateral alliances and base structures now in place.
A second and preferred approach is to move in the direction of some regional "constabulary" force or informal understandings on In sum, a continuation of our Cold War strategy in Asia is not a building block for a new international order. It is time for a change in the U.S. approach --time to build on our past successes, time to elevate our own economic concerns, and time to express confidence in East Asians that they are ready to help us chart a new, [icher, and more pacific future for Asia in the 21st Century.
